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I. Introduction
For most of the last decade, the longest and largest United Nations
Conference in history has negotiated more than three hundred articles
of a treaty covering every aspect of ocean law.' At the end of the 1980
Conference session, the head of the United States delegation an-
nounced that a treaty would be ready for signature in 1981.2 Shortly
before the 1981 session, however, the Reagan Administration an-
nounced that it would review the United States approach to the Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Draft Treaty" or "Treaty") be-
cause of concern that provisions of the Draft Treaty dealing with the
mining of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction3-the so-called
"common heritage of mankind"4 -were unfavorable to American busi-
ness interests.5 The purpose of this Comment is to propose a method
for analyzing whether the provisions of the Draft Treaty applying to
t Mr. Katz, who is in private practice in San Francisco, was Deputy Director of the
U. S. State Department's office of Law of the Sea Negotiations in 1978-1979 and worked on
foreign investment law problems in Indonesia in 1972-1974. The author would like to think
Isadore Katz for his helpful comments.
1. See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/W.P. 10/
Rev.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft Treaty].
2. See, ag., S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 30, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
3. The type of mining currently contemplated is collection of so-called "manganese nod-
ules," which potentially contain large amounts of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese.
See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, OCEAN
MANGANESE NODULES (Comm. Print 1975) (prepared at the request of Sen. Henry M. Jack-
son, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.).
4. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 137(2) ("All rights in the resources of the [deep seabed]
are vested in mankind as a whole .... These resources are not subject to alienation.")
See aso G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028, para. 1
(1970) (Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Sub-
soil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction) ("The sea-bed and ocean floor and
the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the
area, are the common heritage of mankind.")
5. See, e.g., Suddenly, Heavy Weatherfor Talks on Law of the Sea, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
1981, § 4 (Week in Review), at E5, coL 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1981, at 14, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Mar. 4, 1981, at Al, col. 5.
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private seabed mining companies should be an obstacle to ratification
of the entire treaty.
This analysis assumes that the development of a private sector U.S.
deep seabed mining industry is the U.S. goal in the deep seabed mining
negotiations, and therefore focuses on whether the terms and condi-
tions set out by the Draft Treaty are sufficient to attract potential U.S.
seabed mining companies. One perspective from which to address this
issue compares the terms and conditions of the Draft Treaty with the
terms and conditions of terrestrial mining contracts between multina-
tional hard mineral mining companies and developing countries. If the
terms of the Draft Treaty are more burdensome than such mining con-
tracts, then it is fair to assume that seabed mining companies will invest
their money elsewhere. But if the terms of the Draft Treaty compen-
sate for the added risk of mining undersea, then it will be fair to say
that the Law of the Sea negotiations have accommodated the compet-
ing interests of developed and developing countries.
One virtue of the narrow focus of the proposed perspective is that it
may mitigate the rancor engendered by the long negotiating process.
As one of the major battlegrounds between the "North" (developed
countries) and "South" (developing countries) on issues surrounding
the "new international economic order," 6 the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence has generated much ideological rhetoric. Advocates of every ma-
jor economic and political system have espoused their causes; the
resulting document represents a compromise falling somewhere be-
tween the extremes of these divergent systems.
There are those who feel that the provisions of the Draft Treaty ap-
plying to private seabed mining companies should preclude ratification
of the entire Draft Treaty because those provisions do not comport in
all respects with United States economic and political principles. 7 An
alternative view, at once pragmatic and sensitive to the pluralism inher-
ent in the new economic order, focuses on the question whether a via-
ble seabed mining industry can be expected to develop under the
regime proposed in the Draft Treaty. This Comment adopts the latter
6. See generally A. PARDO & E. BORGESE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
DER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1975); Katz, Financial Arrangements for Seabed Mining
Companies: An NIEO Case Study, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 209 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Suddenly, Heavy Weatherfor Talks on Law of the Sea, supra note 5 (remarks
by Rep. J. B. Breaux). Much of the dispute has been over acceptable political and economic
approaches to exploitation of the deep seabed's resources. E.g., Darman, The Law ofthe
Sewr Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373, 387 (1978). ("IT]he direction of the
seabed negotiations must be deeply troubling for those who believe that the principles of
governance affirmed by American experience are worthy of extension.") The instant ap-
proach, by adopting a more functional perspective, obviates the need to address these issues.
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approach and compares the Draft Treaty to mining concession agree-
ments between mineral extraction companies and developing countries.
II. The Draft Treaty v. Terrestrial Mining Concession Agreements
Because of the variety of hard mineral mining contracts in the devel-
oping world, precise comparisons between individual contracts and the
Draft Treaty are beyond the scope of this Comment. The purpose here
is to suggest an approach for dealing with the evident tension between
the Draft Treaty and prevailing practice. Two contracts from the de-
veloping world will serve as illustrations: a model copper mining con-
tract drafted by two American scholars,8 and a model hard mineral
.nining contract from Indonesia.9
A. Governance
The Draft Treaty provides for a system of governance into which the
home governments of multinational mining companies will have much
more formal input than they have under the agreements governing
mining in developing countries. This difference flows from the "com-
mon heritage" concept, which vests rights in the resources of the deep
seabed in all mankind,' 0 whereas the rights to the resources in develop-
ing countries are, of course, vested in those countries." The introduc-
tory language in an illustrative hard mineral agreement from Indonesia
is a typical expression of the latter principle: "All mineral resources
contained in the jurisdictional territories of the Republic of Indonesia,
including the offshore areas, are the national wealth of the Indonesian
nation."12
The unfettered sovereignty that developing countries have over their
8. D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., NEGOTIATING THIRD-WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS
203-60 (1975).
9. M. KUSUMAATMADJA, SURVEY OF INDONESIAN ECONOMIC LAW 8 (1974). Indonesia
is one of the leaders of the developing countries at the Law of the Sea Conference and is the
site of considerable mining of copper and nickel, both of which are found in commercial
quantities in manganese nodules. Moreover, many of the prospective investors in deep sea-
bed mining are terrestrial hard mineral mining companies, and, hence, are familiar with
prevailing terms in the developing world. See, e.g., Letter from Deepsea Ventures, Inc. to
Henry A. Kissinger (Nov. 14, 1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 51, 56 (1975)
(90% of stock of potential investor in nodule mining held by Tenneco Corp., and outstand-
ing stock options held by steel and other mining enterprises).
10. See note 4 supra.
11. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217,
para. 1 (1962) (permanent sovereignty over natural resources) ("The right of peoples and
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised
in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned.")
12. M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 84.
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resources has occasionally resulted in nationalizations, forced contract
renegotiations and joint ventures, which multinational mining compa-
nies understandably consider undesirable. As one observer has stated
with respect to forced renegotiations,
the signing of a concession agreement [with a developing country] is only
the invitation to the ball. The dancing starts later, and the participants
may find some fast fandangos interspersed in the stately quadrilles...
[T]he foreign investor may feel at times that he has entered into a contract
to make concessions rather than a concession contract.1
3
Several factors assure western multinational mining companies
greater predictability and input in dealing with the proposed Interna-
tional Seabed Authority (the "Authority") than they have encountered
in dealing with developing countries. Like the United Nations, the Au-
thority will have two legislative organs, an Assembly in which each
country has one vote,14 and a Council with a more limited member-
ship.' 5 Although the Draft Treaty states that the Assembly "shall be
considered the supreme organ of the Authority,"' 16 it is clear that the
Council has important powers which protect the interests of various
groups, including those of industrialized countries.
For example, western industrialized countries are guaranteed mem-
bership in the Council because they would be a member of two classes
of nations which have an absolute right to Council membership: states
parties to the Treaty which are among the biggest investors in deep
seabed mining 17 and states parties which consume more than 2% of the
world's consumption of the minerals to be produced from the seabed. 18
Furthermore, the voting procedures for the Council require greater
than simple majority approval on certain issues, and require a consen-
sus on some of the issues likely to be most important to the industrial-
ized countries.' 9 "Consensus," which is defined as "the absence of any
13. Powell, L4MCO: A Case Study ofa Concession Contract, 61 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. 89, 92 (1967).
14. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 158 (establishes Assembly and Council) and art. 159
(composition, procedure, and voting of Assembly).
15. Id. art. 161 (composition, procedure, and voting of Council).
16. 1d. art. 160(1).
17. Id. art. 161(l)(a).
18. Id. art. 161(l)(b).
19. See id. art. 161(7)(b), (c) for questions requiring super-majorities and 161(7)(d) for
questions requiring a consensus. These latter questions include the adoption of recommen-
dations made by the Economic Planning Commission on measures to protect developing
countries from reductions in mineral prices caused by seabed mining; recommendations to
the Assembly on rules for states to share benefits and make contributions to the Authority;
and rules for the operation of the Authority and amendments to Part XI of the Treaty deal-
ing with the establishment of the Authority. Id. art. 162(2)(1)(n).
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formal objection," 20 comes very close to providing Council members
with a veto. The consensus requirement should adequately assure that
companies from industrialized countries will not be discriminated
against in access to the deep seabed.
2'
The assurance of access would work in the following manner. An
applicant wishing to mine the deep seabed would apply to the Legal
and Technical Commission of the International Seabed Authority.
This body is made up of qualified technical experts, 22 whose job it
would be to make a written determination of whether an applicant is
qualified on the technical and financial grounds specifically set out in
Annex III of the Treaty.23 Once the Legal and Technical Commission
approves an application, it is deemed to be approved by the Council
unless disapproved by a consensus of the Council.24 Since one western
industrialized country can prevent a consensus, access to the deep sea-
bed for companies from western countries is virtually assured. If an
unsuccessful applicant feels aggrieved, it has recourse to the dispute
settlement mechanisms set up by the Draft Treaty.
25
Other significant powers of the Council include the power to propose
to the Assembly a list of candidates for the office of Secretary General
of the Authority,26 the power to adopt provisional rules and regulations
for seabed mining,27 and the power to establish appropriate mecha-
nisms for directing and supervising a staff of inspectors to assure that
mining companies comply with their contracts and with the rules and
regulations of the International Seabed Authority. 28 Home countries of
mining companies have no analogous powers in the countries where
their companies invest.
The substantial influence, described above, that the home countries
of multinational mining companies will have upon the governance of
the Authority will also help to reduce incidents-frequently reported in
developing countries29-of corruption. Doing business in a corrupt en-
vironment imposes additional costs on companies as well as uncertain-
20. Id. art. 161(7)(e).
21. Guaranteed access to deep seabed hard minerals has been an American concern
since the Kissinger era. See Suddenly, Heavy Weather for Talks on Law of the Sea, supra
note 5.
22. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 165(1).
23. Id. art. 165.
24. Id. art. 162(2)6).
25. Id. art. 187(d). See part B, infra, on dispute settlement.
26. Id. art. 162(2)(b).
27. Id. art. 162(2)(n)(ii).
28. Id. art. 162(2)(y).
29. See, e.g., Andelman, Coping in Indonesia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, § 3 (Business),
at 1, col 1.
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ties regarding their ability to compete solely on the basis of merit.30 If
they do compete successfully, they cannot be certain that satisfactory
performance will enable them to maintain the business they have pro-
cured. In extreme cases, multinational corporation executives find
themselves facing criminal charges that withstand legal challenges only
because the judge is corrupt.
31
Although it cannot be predicted that the proposed Authority will be
completely free of corruption, the fact is that there is no evidence of
widespread corruption in international organizations. If, as is likely,
the system of governance of the Authority is not corrupt, that fact
would give it a tremendous advantage over the bureaucracies in some
developing countries. 32
From the above description, it appears that, under the Draft Treaty,
multinational hard mineral mining companies would be doing business
under a noncorrupt regime into which their "home" governments
would have much more input than they have into the mining regimes
in developing countries. In addition, while dealing with a large inter-
national bureaucracy may not be a prospect that multinational nining
companies relish, it is virtually certain that this bureacracy will not
confront the companies with the kind of coercion they sometimes en-
counter in the developing world.
33
B. Dispute Settlement
The Draft Treaty provides seabed mining companies with a choice
between two dispute settlement alternatives: adjudication by an inter-
30. For American multinational companies the problem is exacerbated because they not
only have to deal with corruption in developing countries, but they also can be prosecuted in
the United States under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, dd-
2 (Supp. 1978), for activity abroad. For a discussion of the Act's significance, see W. REIS-
MAN, FOLDED LIES (1979).
31. For example, a U.S. citizen who was president of the Indonesian subsidiary of a
multinational mining company in the mid-1970's faced such charges as the result of the
dismissal of an employee. See Andelman, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. Indeed, the least stable aspect of the Draft Treaty is Article 155, which provides that
a conference to review the Treaty be convened fifteen years after seabed mining commences.
If that conference does not come to a consensus within five years on how the Treaty should
be changed, if at all, then a vote of two-thirds of the states parties can require that amend-
ments to the Treaty be submitted for ratification to the states parties. If two-thirds of the
states parties ratify such amendments, they are adopted, but they do not affect already ex-
isting contracts.
This unstable aspect of the Treaty is not without its equivalent in the developing coun-
tries, however. The illustrative contract in D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., stupra note 8, at 252-
53, institutionalizes renegotiation of the contract at five-year intervals, a provision that
merely recognizes the historical fact that renegotiation is in any event periodically going to
be demanded by the host country.
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national tribunal or commercial arbitration. In developing countries,
the choice is usually between domestic courts or commercial arbitra-
tion, but these alternatives are sometimes illusory. Indeed, in cases of
nationalization or forced renegotiation, these alternatives have proved
totally unsatisfactory to multinational companies.
Typical contractual provisions for dispute settlement in developing
countries provide that the law of the host country will govern the con-
tract but that international arbitration may be substituted by the par-
ties.34 Enforcement of international arbitration awards may be less
than straightforward, however, as indicated by the Indonesian experi-
ence.
Indonesian courts are often reluctant to recognize judgments of for-
eign courts and they may be no more willing to enforce the awards of
foreign or international arbitral tribunals.35 Arbitral tribunals provide
an alternative of limited value when there is no practical alternative to
enforcement through local Indonesian courts.3 6 It is not even clear
whether Indonesia is a party to the Geneva Convention on the Execu-
tion of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927,37 or to what extent Indonesia
would assert sovereign immunity as a defense to awards of the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 38
Regardless of the technical aspects of the law, political considera-
tions may dominate. As an American lawyer who counsels American
clients with Indonesian interests has stated:
[S]ince the realities of doing business in Indonesia are so different from
the niceties of formal legislation, and since dispute resolution is bound up
with political risks and considerations, it may make little sense to give
much weight to the relatively esoteric consideration of whether Indone-
sia's formal legal system will respond sympathetically to foreign adjudica-
34. See, e.g, M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 105-07, 112; D. SMITH & L. WELLS,
JR., supra note 8, at 251-52. But see Schanze, Mining Agreement in Developing Countries, 12
J. WORLD TRADE L. 135, 170 (1978) ("Some developing nations, especially South American
countries, try to avoid any international arbitration commitments, viewing them as imposi-
tions on their sovereignty and requiring investors to submit exclusively to local courts and to
waive any diplomatic protection ('Calvo Doctrine').")
35. Hornick, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Indonesia, 18
HARV. INT'L L. J. 97, 106 (1977).
36. Id. at 104-05. ("[B]efore a foreign arbitral award can be enforced in Indonesia under
the convention, the party seeking enforcement must obtain the approval of the chairman of
the district court in the district where the award is to be executed." (Footnote omitted.))
37. Id. at 102-04. "Although there is some question under international law as to
whether a successor state is subject to the treaty obligations of its parent state, with respect to
Indonesia the better authority would seem to be that Netherlands Indies treaties which have
not been repudiated are still valid, and that therefore the Geneva Convention remains in
force." Id. at 103-04. Indonesia is not a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
38. Hornick, supra note 35, at 104-06.
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tion. Once a commercial relationship in Indonesia backed only by
Indonesian assets has deteriorated to the point of default and litigation, it
will probably be difficult to obtain satisfaction irrespective of where the
adjudication is held or what law governs-and to the extent it is not, it
will be because of factors largely unrelated to the choice of law and fo-
rum.
39
Such an assessment is not likely to apply to the provisions in the
Draft Treaty for the settlement of disputes related to deep seabed min-
ing. These provisions are a part of the complex set of dispute settle-
ment mechanisms for the Treaty as a whole. Under the Draft Treaty,
twenty-one members of an International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea are chosen by the states parties to the treaty on a one-nation-one-
vote basis.40 The Draft Treaty provides that no two members of the
Tribunal may be nationals of the same state and that there shall be no
fewer than three members from each geographical group established by
the General Assembly of the United Nations.
4'
The twenty-one members of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea elect eleven from their number to compose the Seabed Dis-
putes Chamber.42 The Draft Treaty provides that selection for the
Chamber must assure the representation of all the principal legal sys-
tems of the world and equitable geographical distribution among the
geographical groups established by the General Assembly of the
United Nations.43 The Seabed Disputes Chamber in turn forms an ad
hoc chamber of three of its members to deal with any particular dis-
pute, subject to approval of the parties to the dispute. If the parties
39. Id. at 107. This assessment is echoed by an American lawyer involved in an iron ore
concession agreement in Liberia:
The negotiations and discussions of ... matters ... have all taken place under the
umbrella of the basic Concession Agreement and are governed in the last analysis by
the spirit in which that agreement was negotiated. Actual textual reference to the Con-
cession Agreement is, however, relatively rare. A great deal more depends on the work-
ing relationships between the foreign investors and the representatives of the
Government at all levels; on the ability of the foreign investors to remain in communi-
cation with those representatives, to understand and appreciate their needs and con-
cerns; and on the maintenance at the same time of the integrity of the basic commercial
enterprise without which the Concession becomes valueless to all parties. These goals
cannot be achieved simply by pointing to the small print in the Concession Agreement
or by resort to the provision for arbitration of disputes. Whatever differences of opinion
may arise must be resolved between the parties before they ever reach the arbitration or
litigation stage.
Powell, supra note 13, at 95.
40. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex VI, art. 4.
41. Id. Annex VI, art. 3. These geographical groups are the African Group, the Arab
Group, the Asian Group, the Eastern European Group, the Latin American Group, and the
Western European and Others Group. The latter Group includes the United States.
42. Id. Annex VI, art. 36.
43. Id.
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cannot agree on the composition of this ad hoc panel, then each party
appoints one member of the panel from the Seabed Disputes Chamber,
and these two members in turn appoint a third or, if the two members
cannot agree, the third is appointed by the president of the Seabed Dis-
putes Chamber.44
Seabed mining companies are not limited to the use of ad hoc cham-
bers in the settlement of their disputes. If the companies wish, they
may submit their disputes to binding commercial arbitration.45 How-
ever, if the arbitral tribunal decides that an interpretation of the Law of
the Sea Convention is necessary to its decision, it must then refer the
issue to the Seabed Disputes Chamber.
46
While the complex dispute settlement mechanism of the Draft Treaty
does not assure satisfactory decisions, the international context and
choice of forum are factors not present in many developing countries
and help to assure fairness. Moreover, the international context obvi-
ates the need for a separate procedure-often necessary in developing
countries-for the recognition of foreign judgments.
C. Financial Arrangements
The financial arrangements in the Draft Treaty for seabed mining
companies are not markedly different from those for companies mining
the same minerals47 in developing countries. Because there has never
been mining of the deep seabed on a commercial scale, the Law of the
Sea Conference has based the financial arrangements of the Draft
Treaty on a model of the future seabed mining industry created by a
team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.48 That model,
which has been used as a basis for negotiations at the conference by
developed and developing countries alike, provides a series of different
internal rates of return based on various assumptions. The average in-
ternal rate of return based on this model is about 15%.
The Treaty sets up four charges to mining companies: an application
processing fee; a fixed annual fee; a production charge; and a share of
net proceeds. 49 The processing fee is $500,000 or the actual cost to the
44. Id. Annex VI, art. 37. None of the members of the ad hoc chamber may be a na-
tional or in the service of any of the parties to the dispute. Regardless of which option-
adjudication in the Tribunal or commercial arbitration-is selected, the parties may also
agree to a decision ex aequo et bono. Id. art. 293(2).
45. Id. art. 188(2)(a).
46. Id. art. 188(2)(b).
47. See note 3 supra.
48. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, OCEAN
MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 216-17.
49. At the option of the producer, this fourth charge may be eliminated in consideration
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International Seabed Authority for processing the application5o which-
ever is less. Either amount would be a small percentage of the esti-
mated billion dollar investment that it will take to start a seabed
mining operation. Although called by a different name, this payment is
comparable in kind and magnitude to "premium payments" made to
developing countries in return for the grant of the concession.5'
The Draft Treaty requires a fixed annual fee of $1 million per year.5 2
The contractor makes this payment to the International Seabed Au-
thority as of the effective date of the contract, but payment of this fee
may be postponed if commercial operations are postponed.5 3 Once
commercial operations begin, mining companies need not pay the an-
nual fee if the production charge that they pay to the International Sea-
bed Authority exceeds $1 million.5 4 The fixed annual fee is, therefore,
essentially equivalent to a security deposit or a bond for performance
to insure that the mining company rapidly develops its operation. Such
security deposits or performance bonds are common in mining con-
tracts in developing countries.55
The Draft Treaty also provides for a production charge of 2% for the
time before the mining company has recovered its initial investment
and a charge of 4% thereafter.5 6 This charge is generally less burden-
some than the royalties that developing countries charge to mining
companies.57
The share of net proceeds that the Draft Treaty requires mining
companies to pay the International Seabed Authority is graduated ac-
cording to return on investment. During the period before the mining
company has recovered its initial investment, it must pay the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority 35% of its net proceeds attributable to deep
seabed mining if its return on investment is less than 10%, 42.5% of
these net proceeds if its return on investment is between 10% and 20%,
of a higher annual production charge. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 13(5). This provision
was designed for socialist countries. Katz, supra note 6, at 218. The following textual dis-
cussion will be limited to the option of paying a production charge and a share of net pro-
ceeds.
50. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 13(2).
51. See D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., supra note 8, at 234 (illustrative agreement).
52. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 13(3).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 90; D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., supra note
8, at 234.
56. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 13(6).
57. See D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., supra note 8, at 62, 234 (rates for various metals in
selected countries); Schanze, supra note 34, at 158 (royalty rates vary from one to 15% of
production value or gross revenues).
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and 50% of these net proceeds if its return on investment is greater than
20%. Once the mining company has recovered its cost of investment, it
must pay to the International Seabed Authority 40% of its net proceeds
attributable to deep seabed mining if its return on investment is be-
tween zero and 10%, 50% of these net proceeds on a return between
10% and 20%, and 70% of these net proceeds on a return greater than
20%.58
These shares of net proceeds are not dissimilar to the income flow to
developing countries from mining agreements, which usually include
taxes additional to those mentioned above. In Indonesia, for example,
the tax rate on mining companies is 35% of taxable income for the first
10 years of operation and 45% thereafter.5 9 In addition to this corpora-
tion tax, the mining company must bear property tax, dead rent, and
stamp duties.60
On the whole, then, the financing fees the Authority is empowered to
charge mining concerns are quite similar to those appearing in the hard
mineral contracts that multinational mining companies have signed
with developing countries. This aspect of the Draft Treaty should not,
therefore, be an obstacle to ratification. 6'
D. Technology Transfer and Related Concepts
Because the developing countries negotiating the Law of the Sea
Treaty want more than mere revenues from the common heritage con-
cept,62 they have insisted on a "parallel system" of mining under which
the international community would be able to develop a self-sustaining
deep seabed mining company at the same time that private companies
are mining the seabed. To accomplish this, the Draft Treaty contains
provisions for the transfer of technology from seabed mining compa-
nies to the Authority,63 for the transfer of explored mine sites from sea-
bed mining companies to the Authority," and for the training by the
seabed mining companies of personnel from developing countries. 65
58. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 13(6).
59. See M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 98, 114.
60. Id. at 96, 114.
61. For a more detailed analysis of the financial arrangements for deep seabed mining
companies in the Draft Treaty, see Katz, supra note 6.
62. See, e.g., Silberstein, Proprietary Protection for Deepsea Mining Technology in Return
for Technology Transfer, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 135, 139 (1978) (developing countries "now
realize that monetary payments alone can never adequately reimburse them for the exploita-
tion of their non-renewable natural resources" (footnote omitted)).
63. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 5. Cf id. arts. 144, 266, 269, 273 (secon-
dary references to transfer of technology).
64. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 8.
65. Id. Annex III, art. 15. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 143(3)(6)(ii) (marine sci-
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These provisions have been among the most controversial in the
United States domestic debate over the Draft Treaty.66 These require-
ments, however, may be no more burdensome than certain non-busi-
ness expenses associated with hard mineral extraction in developing
countries, where contracts often require more of mining companies
than merely profit-sharing or the payment of fees.67
1. The Draft Treaty
The Draft Treaty provides for a limited transfer of seabed mining
technology, which it defines as "the specialized equipment and techni-
cal know-how, including manuals, designs, operating instructions,
training and technical advice and assistance, necessary to assemble,
maintain and operate a viable system and the legal right to use these
items for that purpose on a non-exclusive basis."'68 The transfer is a
limited one primarily because the technology involved relates only to
the actual mining of the seabed and not to any other activity-such as
ore processing-of the mining company.69 Second, the Authority's
power to demand technology transfer lasts only for the first ten years
the Authority is in operation.70 Furthermore, this technology is to be
made available on "fair and reasonable commercial terms and condi-
tions," 71 and, if there is a dispute on what is fair and reasonable, the
dispute "may be submitted by either party to binding commercial arbi-
tration. '72 The Authority can force a technology transfer only if it can-
not obtain the same or equally efficient and useful technology on the
open market on fair and reasonable commercial terms and condi-
entific research training), art. 202 (training on protection of marine environment), art.
144(2)(b) (training in marine science and technology).
66. See, e.g., Suddenly, Heavy Weatherfor Talks on Law of the Sea, supra note 5. See
also Brown & Fabian, Toward MutualAccountability in the Nonterrestrial Realms, 29 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 877, 879 (1975) ("Mining interests argue that only national governments can
provide the security of license and title arrangements conducive to further progress by ven-
turesome firms now developing the capability to extract hard minerals from the deep sea
bed.")
67. See Farer, Economic Development Agreements: A Functional Analysis, 10 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 200 (1971); M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 100, 109-10 (provisions
for training Indonesian nationals and infrastructure construction); D. SMITH & L. WELLS,
JR., supra note 8, at 97-98 (natural resource and economic development through contract
relations to equalize trade terms); Schanze, supra note 34, at 136-40 (concession, work, and
service contracts most common examples of contractual cooperation between investor and
host states).
68. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, Annex III, art. 5(8).
69. Id. Annex III, art. 5(1) ("developers will inform Authority of equipment and meth-
ods to be used in the area").
70. Id. Annex III, art. 5(7).
71. Id. Annex III, art. 5(3)(a).
72. Id. Annex III, art. 5(4).
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tions.73
Upon application to the Authority, a mining company must describe
two explored sites of equal value. The Authority then grants the appli-
cant one of these sites and keeps the other for itself.74 Developing
countries may apply for the sites the Authority has retained,75 and de-
veloping countries awarded deep seabed sites may obtain technology
from a seabed mining company on the same terms as the Authority.
76
The country may not, however, transfer that technology to third parties
and may use it only on that specific mine site.77 A developing country
may also demand training for its personnel, as may the Authority.78
2. Terrestrial Mining Agreements
Technology transfer provisions of the type found in the Draft Treaty
have recently been increasingly common and important in resource ex-
ploitation agreements with developing countries. 79 Terrestrial mining
contracts, however, provide few of the safeguards found in the Draft
Treaty and abuses have resulted such as unauthorized transfer of ad-
vanced technology to third parties.80
Developing country hard mineral mining contracts often require
more training of indigenous personnel than does the Draft Treaty. In
general, such clauses have become more common and of greater con-
cern to developing countries in recent years.8' In Indonesia, for exam-
ple, mining companies are required not only to train Indonesian
technicians but also to "employ Indonesian personnel to the maximum
extent practicable, so that not less than 75% of all positions in each
employment classification. . . are held by Indonesian nationals within
five years after the commencement of the Operating Period in ques-
tion."' 82 This obligation is dependent upon the availability of qualified
Indonesian nationals as judged by the company, which may not exer-
73. Id. Annex III, art. 5(3)(a).
74. Id. Annex III, art. 8.
75. Id. Annex III, art. 9(4).
76. Id. Annex III, art. 5(3)(e).
77. Id. Annex III, art. 5(3)(e).
78. Id. Annex III, art. 15.
79. Goekjian, Legal Problems of Transferring Technology to the Third World, 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 565 (1977).
80. Id. at 567.
81. See Adede, A Profile of Trends in the State Contractsfor Natural Resources Develop-
ment Between Afrian Countries and Foreign Companies, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 479,
497 (1980).
82. M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 100. Cf. D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., supra
note 8, at 241-42 (illustrative agreement for Third World development project, provisions for
employment and training of host country nationals).
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cise this power unreasonably.8 3 Most mining companies operating in
Indonesia are in compliance with this requirement.
Developing countries also sometimes require multinational compa-
nies to "buy local," a requirement that does not exist in the Draft
Treaty.84 Such a requirement can force a company to buy more expen-
sive or less satisfactory goods than those available elsewhere.85
"Infrastructure clauses," entirely absent from the Draft Treaty, also
impose additional expenses of a non-business nature on terrestrial min-
ing operations in developing countries. Such clauses may require, for
example, a mining company to establish processing, smelting, and
manufacturing facilities in the host country if such facilities are eco-
nomically feasible.86 The company may also be required to provide
numerous facilities, including railroads, ports, roads, schools, hospitals,
and dams, as "infrastructure" within the meaning of these contracts.8
7
Such projects can be very expensive because there is often little ex-
isting infrastructure in developing countries. For example, 40% of the
cost of the LAMCO iron ore project in Liberia represented infrastruc-
ture development.8 8 Moreover, it is not uncommon for developing
countries to require the companies to make their infrastructure avail-
able to third parties so long as such a requirement does not prejudice
the operations of the company. 89
Whether the costs of provisions like infrastructure clauses are more
burdensome than the technology transfer provisions of the Draft
Treaty is a question that has not been analyzed to date. The functional
approach proposed by this Comment suggests that such an analysis
83. M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 100-01.
84. See, e.g., Andelman, supra note 29.
85. Id.
86. See M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 109; D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., supra
note 8, at 223.
87. M. KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 9, at 110 (company to co-operate with government
to provide living accommodations and assist in maximizing economic and social benefits);
D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., supra note 8, at 239-40 (illustrative Agreement For Third World
mineral development project containing provision for "Additional Infrastructure And Other
Facilities"); Adede, supra note 81, at 499-500 (modern natural resource contracts between
African states and foreign companies contain provisions for training host country nationals,
maintaining suitable working conditions, making available free medical services, construct-
ing schools).
88. Powell, supra note 13, at 91.
89. D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., supra note 8, at 240; Powell, supra note 13, at 92-95.
Powell reports that in Liberia not only did local people unrelated to the company use the
schools that the company had built, but also many "wards" came from all over the country
to use these facilities. "When action was taken to restrict at least the attendance of these
'wards,' the Government advised that, under well-established Liberian customs, wards were
to be treated equally with natural children, however tenuous their relationship might be."
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should be made before a decision is reached on whether the technology
transfer provisions of the Draft Treaty are an obstacle to ratification.
E. Production Limitation
Developing countries have been concerned at the Law of the Sea
Conference to protect land-based mineral producers from the effects of
a surge in production from the seabed, because a number of influential
developing countries are dependent on revenues from land-based min-
ing of minerals also found in the seabed.90 Proposals for protection of
terrestrial producers have been highly controversial in the United
States.91 The Draft Treaty contemplates a limitation on seabed pro-
duction as a result of an international commodity agreement or, failing
that, a production limitation. 9
2
The possibility that the Authority might join an international com-
modity agreement does not set it apart from developing countries
where multinational mining companies operate. OPEC 93 countries, for
example, certainly control the production of all companies within their
jurisdiction. Although no cartel currently has effective control over
prices or production of a hard mineral, there have been recent attempts
to cartelize strategic hard minerals.94
Furthermore, developing countries have other policies that might af-
fect the production level of a mining company. The Organization of
African Unity boycott of South Africa is one example of political moti-
vation to limit trade with certain states in a way that may affect total
production.
With respect to production limitations absent a commodity agree-
ment, the Draft Treaty prohibits seabed mining companies from pro-
ducing more than 60% of the growth of the nickel market in any given
year for the first twenty-five years that the Treaty is in effect.95 This
provision has no parallel in terrestrial mining contracts, but there is
little doubt that a developing country could unilaterally limit produc-
tion in a similar manner if it expected to benefit from doing so, such as
90. See Darman, supra note 7, at 389 (noting the conflict between these countries and
other more ideologically "pure" members of the "Group of 77").
91. See Suddenly, Heapy Weatherfor Talks on Law of the Sea, supra note 5.
92. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 151. The Draft Treaty also has a floor: an assumed
annual nickel market growth rate of 3%. Id. art. 15 l(2)(b)(iv).
93. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
94. The most recent example of an international hard mineral cartel was the organiza-
tion and operation of the international uranium cartel. For an extended analysis of the
cartel and its effect on U.S. policy, see J. TAYLOR & M. YOKELL, YELLOWCAKE: THE INTER-
NATIONAL URANIUM CARTEL 57-119, 141-59 (1979). But see Darman, supra note 7, at 389
("[T]he State Department ...argufed] that the prospects of land-based cartelization in
[hard] minerals are neither analogous to OPEC nor likely to prove consequential.")
95. Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 15 1(b)(ii).
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when current prices of a.mineral were low and the developing country
thought its resources would have more value if left in the ground.
In adopting a position on the production limitations continued in the
Draft Treaty, the United States should consider whether, as drafted,
the limitations will have any practical effect upon multinational mining
companies. The State Department has consistently maintained that the
production limitations in the Draft Treaty permit sufficient production
to accommodate all potential seabed miners for the twenty-five years of
the provision's operation.96 If the State Department is correct, the mere
fact that the Draft Treaty contains a production limitation should not
present an obstacle to United States ratification of the entire Treaty.
97
III. Conclusion
The deep seabed mining provisions of the Draft Treaty represent the
carefully, indeed painstakingly, negotiated position of more than 150
nations. Given the widely divergent interests and philosophies of many
of those nations, it is hardly surprising that the resulting text is not in
every respect favorable to United States interests and aspirations. It
may be valuable, therefore, to evaluate the Draft Treaty provisions
functionally rather than ideologically.
To determine whether the Draft Treaty provisions regarding deep
seabed mining are sufficiently responsive to American business inter-
ests, the United States should look to other potentially high-risk situa-
tions in which there has been successful investment. Hard mineral
concession agreements between western mining corporations and de-
veloping countries are offered as most closely analogous. 98
96. Aldrich, Law of the Sea, DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb., 1981, at 56, 58 (address before
National Association of Manufacturers, San Francisco on Dec. 9, 1980, by Acting Special
Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference) ("As now formulated,
the production ceiling is not likely to bar access for any qualified miner."); Richardson,
Seabed Mining and Law of the Sea, DEP'T STATE BULL., Dec., 1980, at 60, 62 (address before
American Mining Congress, San Francisco on Sept. 24, 1980 by Special Representative of
the President for the Law of the Sea Conference) ("[M]arket forces, not the production limi-
tation formula, will determine how much nickel, and, therefore, how much copper, cobalt,
and manganese will be produced by the first generation of seabed mining projects.")
97. Indeed, though ideologically not in accord with free enterprise, production limita-
tions are not unknown in the United States. For example, the Texas Railroad Commission
for years sat each month to set the output of most Texas oil wells. See C. TUGENDIIAT & A.
HAMILTON, OIL 274-75 (1975); R. SULLIVAN, THE HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW 311-15
(1955).
98. A functional analysis also suggests consideration of the likely consequence of the
United States' failure to ratify a Law of the Sea Treaty, particularly the potential for interna-
tional conflict over exclusive rights to exploit seabed mineral resources. See, e.g., Deep Sea-
bed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980) (to be codified at
30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-73) (creating exclusive rights pending ratification of a final Law of the Sea
text); Richardson, Power, Mob'lity and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 902 (1980);
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This Comment has attempted briefly to illustrate both the value of a
functional approach and the insights such an approach might yield
with regard to the seabed mining provisions of the Draft Treaty. Ulti-
mately, a pragmatic analysis of the proposed deep seabed mining re-
gime must take into account the same factors another commentator has
suggested are essential to the success of mining operations in develop-
ing countries.
Maintaining the partnership relationship established by the Concession
Agreement involves much more than simply operating an efficient mine
at a profit, and resolving routine problems on a day to day basis. The
economic and human aspirations of a developing country and its people
are inextricably involved and must be recognized and encouraged. Com-
munication, cooperation and, above all, concern for those aspirations, are
the keys to success. 99
The Draft Treaty represents a compromise between the aspirations
of the developed and developing countries of the world. In considering
the importance of those aspirations during its review of the Draft
Treaty, the United States may wish to evaluate them from several dif-
ferent perspectives. At least one of those perspectives, however, should
be the actual effect "common heritage" provisions are likely to have
upon opportunities for American businesses to extract deep seabed
minerals.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1981, at A30, col. 4 (letter to editor from John R. Stevenson, former
Department of State Legal Adviser, arguing that Draft Treaty provisions on seabed mining
are more favorable to United States than absence of treaty).
99. Powell, supra note 13, at 95.
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